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of the British Computer Society
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Past RESG Event
RE for Dependability
Date
07 December 2005 (free lunch from 1.00, talks begin at 2.00)
Venue
G21/22, Devonshire building, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne [MAP]
Registration
Free to RESG members, £10.00 for non-members.
Contact Pete Sawyer (sawyer@comp.lancs.ac.uk)
Schedule
1.00 - 2.00
Lunch and registration
2.00 - 2.40
Charles Haley. The Open University. Arguing Security: Validating Security Requirements Using Structured Argumentation.
2.40 - 3.20
David Bush. National Air Traffic Services. Early lifecylce hazard identification using I*.
3.20 - 4.00
Chris Johnson. University of Glasgow. Learning the Lessons of Hurricane Katrina: Developing Large-Scale Simulations for Hospital Evacuations.
4.00 - 4.40
DIRC tbc.
4.40 - 5.00
Final questions and roundup.
Speaker Biographies and talk synopses
David Bush
David Bush is a Principal Systems Engineer at UK National Air Traffic Services, where he is responsible for the team providing specialist safety support to projects, and developing the state of the art in safety engineering within NATS. His particular interest is in safety requirements, and in goal based modelling approaches. He is secretary of the BCS Requirements Engineering Specialist Group.
Early Lifecycle Hazard Identification using I*
Identifying and dealing with hazards early in system development offers huge benefits. The scope for removal, reduction and mitigation is at its greatest before requirements and design are committed. Inevitably, however, it is at this early stage that there is the lightest description of the system, and the weakest basis from which to identify hazards.
Recently the i* approach has become widespread to support reasoning about early concepts and requirements. This presentation will discuss i* concepts and features which make it useful as a modelling approach for safety analysis, and will show how a HAZOPS approach can be applied to very early stage i* models.
Charles Haley
Charles Haley is a Lecturer in the Computing Department of The Open University. Before re-entering the academic community in 1999, he worked for 25 years in the software industry at companies including Bell Laboratories Computing Science Research Center, Rational Software, Bell Northern Research, and Sun Microsystems, holding positions ranging from software engineer to director of development. At Rational Software, he was both architect and lead engineer of Rational Software's acclaimed configuration management system. His work in semantics-driven code browsing was incorporated into Rational Subsystems, the precursor to subsystems in UML. While at Sun Microsystems, he was an architect for a customer management system for a major European telephone company.
Charles joined The Open University in 2003, where his research is in the representation of security requirements, their validation through formal and informal argumentation, and their relationship to system specifications. His academic publications include five international conference and journal papers, five international workshop papers, and two book chapters (they will appear in 2006). He has served on eight international workshop program committees, and was a pre-publication reviewer of two books on aspect-oriented software development. Charles holds a BA and MS in Computer Science from the University of California at Berkeley, and is currently pursuing a PhD in the same field. For more information, please see http://mcs.open.ac.uk/cbh46/.
Arguing Security: Validating Security Requirements Using Structured Argumentation.
The talk begins with a definition of security requirements and how they are derived, and then presents the use of arguments to show that a system-to-be can satisfy its security requirements. These arguments, called 'satisfaction arguments', are in two parts: a formal argument based upon claims about domain properties, and a set of informal arguments that justify the claims being made. We show how the use of satisfaction arguments assists in clarifying whether and how a system satisfies its security requirements, as well as identifying the properties of domains that are critical to the requirements.
Chris Johnson
Chris Johnson is Professor of Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. He heads a small research group that focuses specificially on learning lessons from the failure of previous systems. He has authored more than 100 papers and his 'Handbook of Accident and Incident Reporting' has been used by the US NTSB, AEA, BAe, MAIB etc and can be downloaded for free from: http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/book
Learning the Lessons of Hurricane Katrina: Developing Large-Scale Simulations for Hospital Evacuations
This talk argues that interactive simulations can be used to plan for emergency evacuations. However, the previous development of these systems has lagged behind recent events. For instance, the attacks on the World Trade Center taught us to focus more on the ingress of emergency personnel and not simply on the egress of building occupants. Hurricane Katrina has taught us some new lessons. For the first time, we have had to consider modelling the evacuation of US hospitals under sniper fire. The talk will illustrate some of the simulators that we have developed for hospital evacuations and will draw further lessons from the events in New Orleans.
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